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ABSTRACT  
Hackers pose a continuous and unrelenting threat to organizations. Industry and academic researchers 
alike can benefit from a greater understanding of how hackers engage in criminal behavior. A limiting 
factor of hacker research is the inability to verify that self-proclaimed hackers participating in research 
actually possess their purported knowledge and skills. This paper presents current work in developing and 
validating a conceptual-expertise based tool that can be used to discriminate between novice and expert 
hackers. The implications of this work are promising since behavioral information systems researchers 
operating in the information security space will directly benefit from the validation of this tool. 
Keywords: hacker ability, conceptual expertise, skill measurement  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Governments, businesses, universities and other 
organizations are prime targets for hackers. A 
common motive for hackers to target these 
organizations is data theft [1] which results in 
billions of dollars of losses annually [2]. Due to 
the threat that hackers pose to organizations, 
researchers have been encouraged to investigate 
hacker motives and behavior [3]. There have been 
recent attempts to further understand hacker 
behavior e.g., [2], [4], [5]. However, these studies 
rely on data collected from self-reported hackers. 
Respondents can pose as hackers due to gain the 
incentives provided during data collection. It is 
unverifiable whether the samples utilized in prior 
research are based on data collected from actual 
hackers or whether these samples are based on 
data collected from persons misrepresenting their 
hacking abilities and experience. A consequence 
of this uncertainty is the questionable validity and 
generalizability of the findings reported in prior 
hacking research.  
A second issue is the tendency for researchers to 
lump all hackers into a single category during data 
analysis. This is typically done as a means of 
comparing hackers to other groups, but previous 
research indicates that there is more than one type 
of hacker [6]. Categories of hackers include: script 
kiddies, petty thieves, virus writers, professional 
criminals, and government agents [6], [7]. 
Furthermore, the motivations and skill levels of 
different types of hackers are varied [6]. In light of 
these differences, hacking researchers would 
benefit tremendously from the ability to more 
accurately measure each hacker’s level of skill. 
The ability to measure hacking skill would allow 
researchers to verify that a self-proclaimed hacker 
indeed possesses requisite technical skills. It 
would also allow analyses to be conducted on 
subsets of data for different groups of hackers 
based on their level of skill and areas of expertise. 
In short, there is currently no scientific measure 
that can be used to assess hacking skill level 
without employing qualitative research methods 
(e.g., interviews) [8]. While effective, qualitative 
methods are much less scalable than survey-based 
methods as surveys can be administered widely 
with few temporal or geographic limitations. 
Furthermore, hacking activities often require 
behavior that is criminal in nature; a survey-based 
methodology for data collection may elicit a more 
candid response from a participant since the 
identity of the respondent can remain anonymous.  
The goal of this research is to develop a survey-
based methodology for determining a hacker’s 
skill level using an 18-scenario scale. If a scale can 
be developed to measure a hacker’s skill level, 
researchers can (1) more accurately discriminate 
between categories of hackers, (2) more accurately 
quantify who is a hacker and who is not, and (3) 
provide evidence that their findings are indeed 
generalizable to the population of interest. 
The scale development process used for this 
research is in accordance with recognized scale 
development protocols [9] and is based on 
measuring conceptual expertise, an approach 
previously utilized by researchers in a variety of 
disciplines [10], [11]. Upon completing scale 
development, this research proposes to collect and 
analyze data to validate the accuracy of the 
measurement tool. This paper presents an 
overview of the scale development process 
concerning the validity of this novel approach to 
measuring hacker ability.  
2. SCALE DEVELOPMENT 
There are six recommended phases used for scale 
development: 1) conceptualization, 2) 
development of measures, 3) model specification, 
4) scale evaluation and refinement, 5) validation, 
and 6) norm development [9]. Each of these steps 
is discussed in the following sections.   
2.1 Conceptualization 
The goal of the conceptualization phase is to 
provide a precise definition of the construct of 
interest and establish conceptual arguments for 
how the construct can be discriminated from 
previously-specified and evaluated constructs 
found in literature [9]. This paper introduces 
hacking conceptual expertise as a new construct 
based on the conceptual expertise construct found 
in cognitive science literature [10], [12]. Hacking 
conceptual expertise is comparable to, and should 
distinguish from, two similar constructs: computer 
self-efficacy [13] and computer ability [14]. This 
section will first discuss expertise before 
addressing computer self-efficacy and computer 
ability. 
Expertise is a “manifestation of skills and 
understanding resulting from the accumulation of 
a large body of knowledge” [12, p. 167]. A 
hacker’s expertise is manifested in their ability to 
write code or scripts that can circumvent security 
protocols, disrupt the intended functions of a 
system, collect valuable information, and not get 
caught [6]. Many hackers are novices, sometimes 
referred to as “script kiddies”, who have only a 
surface understanding of hacking but still employ 
software and scripts written by experts to perform 
their attacks [6], [15]. Expert hackers understand 
hacking at a deeper level as they have a command 
of the common weaknesses and vulnerabilities of 
information systems. Therefore, we formally 
define the construct hacking conceptual expertise 
as the manifestation of skills and understanding 
about circumventing security protocols, disrupting 
the intended functions of systems, collecting 
valuable information, and not getting caught. 
Computer self-efficacy is a similar construct to 
hacking conceptual expertise and is based on 
Social Cognitive Theory (SCT).  SCT explains 
that social pressures, context, cognitive and 
personal characteristics, and behavior are 
reciprocally determined. [13], [16]. Self-efficacy is 
part of the cognitive and personal characteristics 
that drive behavior [13], [17]. Self-efficacy is a 
belief people have about their capacity to perform 
an action and their skill at performing the action 
[13], [17]. According to SCT, people are more 
likely to act if they believe that there will be 
positive outcomes as a result of their action [13], 
[17]. If people believe that they are good at an 
action, they are more likely to believe that they 
will receive a positive outcome by performing the 
action, and therefore, will be more likely to 
perform the action [13], [17]. Computer self-
efficacy is the belief people have about their 
capacity to perform actions that accomplish a 
computer-based task [13]. Computer self-efficacy 
has three main components: magnitude, strength, 
and generalizability [13]. Magnitude refers to the 
perception that people can accomplish more 
difficult tasks [13]. Strength refers to the 
confidence people have in being able to perform 
the tasks [13]. Generalizability refers to the extent 
to which a person’s judgments include multiple 
activities [13]. 
Another similar measure to hacking conceptual 
expertise is computer ability [14]. Computer 
ability is based on two concepts: how important a 
skill is to a task and the perceived skill level of the 
individual in performing a task [14]. This research 
will demonstrate that hacking conceptual expertise 
is both distinct from and an antecedent to 
computer self-efficacy and computer ability. 
2.2 Development of Measures 
Measurement development is a process 
traditionally completed in two steps. First, a set of 
items that represent the construct is generated, and 
second, the content validity of the set of items is 
assessed [9]. Before discussing the generation of 
items, this paper will first discuss how these items 
will be used in a specialized task to measure 
hacker conceptual expertise rather than using a 
traditional survey. 
2.2.1 The Conceptual Expertise Task 
When people solve problems they approach tasks 
based on the mental representation they have of 
the problem [10], [18]. Their mental 
representations are based on stored information 
(memories) that assist in knowledge-based 
decisions [19]. People use stored information as 
nodes (or waypoints) that allow them to follow a 
solution path [20], [21]. Therefore, problem 
solvers use the mental representations they have of 
the task to find a solution. For example, chess 
masters can identify more ways to achieve 
checkmate (where the nodes are necessary moves) 
than novice chess players. 
Experts perform tasks better than novices as they 
have superior mental representations of problems; 
this is attributable to larger quantities of stored 
information and solution nodes (i.e., steps to 
achieve the solution) [10]. In other words, experts 
have more strategies at their disposal to find 
solutions to problems as compared with novices. 
Due to larger quantities of stored information, 
experts typically organize information into 
abstract categories [10]. Abstract categories are 
used to filter tasks and potential solutions; they 
allow experts to more quickly and efficiently solve 
problems [10]. These abstract categories form the 
basis for testing expertise. 
The abstract categorization of experts can be 
leveraged to distinguish between experts and 
novices. When given a set of related problems 
(e.g., end of chapter questions in a textbook) and 
asked to group the problems, experts will rely on 
their abstract categories to organize the problems 
based on principles of the domain [12]. When 
novices are given the same task, however, they 
will organize the problems based on physical 
evidence, explicit words, or formulas [12]. For 
example, in a study distinguishing between expert 
and novice programmers, experts sorted 
programming problems by solution algorithms and 
novices sorted the same problems by application 
areas [22].  
Researchers can capitalize on this difference 
between experts and novices (abstract categories 
versus physical evidence) to create a scoring 
system to measure expertise [10], [11]. To create 
this scoring system, underlying principles from the 
domain of expertise are derived from literature, 
textbooks, and other related sources. These 
underlying principles are termed deep features as 
they show understanding of a given domain (e.g., 
social engineering). Deep features are contrasted 
with surface features that are the objects or 
contexts (e.g., stealing financial data) represented 
in a problem [10]. When participants group deep 
features together more often than they group 
surface features, the participants are considered 
experts. When participants group surface features 
together more often than they group deep features, 
the participants are considered novices. 
The conceptual knowledge task is typically 
performed using a card sort of relevant scenarios 
on 3x5 cards with each card having one deep 
feature and one surface feature [11]. An example 
of a scenario with a deep feature of system 
resource consumption and a surface feature of 
financial data is as follows: 
Eve sends out requests to millions 
of machines using an IP address 
assigned to a server at a stock 
brokerage. 
While this is an example of a scenario that could 
be displayed on one card, assume that a researcher 
creates 18 cards lettered A-R, each possessing a 
unique hacking-related scenario containing a deep 
feature and a surface feature. The hypothesized 
groupings could look something like Table 1. 
Participants, without seeing Table 1 or knowing 
the hypothesized features, are asked to sort the 
cards into groups with the following restrictions: 
 You must create more than one group 
 Each group must have at least 2 cards and 
fewer than 15 cards 
 Each card can only be a part of 1 group 
 Create a name for your groups 
Table 2 provides an example of how a participant 
might group the scenarios. Once grouped, 
researchers can score the pairings of every 
combination in each group to classify it as a 
surface feature pair (S), a deep feature pair (D), or 
an unexpected pair (U). For example, the pair P-G 
in the participant’s first group is a surface feature 
pair as both scenarios are in the “usernames and 
passwords” column. The pair L-I in the 
participant’s second group is a deep feature pair as 
both scenarios are in the “input validation” row. 
The pair F-E in the participant’s third group is an 
unexpected pair as the two scenarios are neither in 
the same row nor the same column. In total, this 
participant identified 6 deep pairings, 12 surface 
pairings, and 18 unexpected pairings. This 
participant is likely more novice than expert as he 
or she identified more surface features than deep 
features. However, the participant could have 
created an even higher number of surface feature 
pairs, thus he or she is likely not a complete 
novice.
Table 1 Example problem matrix 
  
Hypothesized surface features 
  
Fake website 
Usernames and 
passwords Financial data 
H
y
p
o
th
e
s
iz
e
d
 d
e
e
p
 f
e
a
tu
re
s
 
Authentication/ 
Authorization 
H D O 
Hiding tracks F N A 
Input validation/ Memory 
override 
Q J E 
Resource consumption M P R 
Social engineering K G C 
Vulnerability detection B L I 
 
 
2.2.2 Generating items for the hacking 
conceptual expertise task 
The next step in scale development is to “generate 
a set of items that fully represent the conceptual 
domain of the construct” [9, p. 304]. For the 
conceptual expertise task, the generation of items 
begins with the identification of deep features. 
Previous researchers using the conceptual 
expertise task have used textbook problems to 
identify deep features see [10], [11]. As 
information security textbooks do not typically 
provide information on how to engage in criminal 
hacking behavior, we relied on both information 
security textbooks and academic literature 
addressing hacking scenarios to generate deep 
features for the hacking conceptual exercise. Table 
3 contains a thorough, but not exhaustive, list of 
vulnerabilities and security measures identified in 
the set of textbooks and relevant literature used for 
this study [1], [4], [6], [8], [23]–[40].   
Table 2 Example participant grouping result 
Group 1 – Hacks that involve numerous targets 
P, O, M, J, Q, G, D 
 
Group 2 – Hacks that involve hacker input 
N, L, A, I 
 
Group 3 – Hacks that involve pretending to be someone else or pretending to do something good 
F, E, B, R 
 
Group 4 – Hacks that involve programming 
K, H, C 
 
Table 3 Hacks, vulnerabilities, and security measures referenced in relevant literature 
Authentication/Authorization Encryption, Security tokens, Permissions, Password cracking, Two-step 
commit, Certificate authorities, Password salting, Keystroke logging, 
Rainbow tables, Brute force attacks 
Hiding tracks Malware signatures, Removing log files, Audit-disabling software, 
Disabling security controls, Using proxies, IP spoofing, Steganography 
Input validation/Memory 
override 
Buffer overflow, Cross-site scripting, Maladvertising, SQL injection, 
Heap spraying, Format string attacks, Dangling pointers 
Resource consumption Denial of service attacks, Syn flood, ACK storm, Email bombs, HTTP 
POST DDOS, Smurf attacks, Spamming 
Social engineering Spear Phishing, Pharming, Nigerian scam, Phishing 
Vulnerability detection Man in the middle attacks, Port scanning, Ping sweeps, Packet sniffing, 
Network mapping, War driving, Bluesnarfing 
Actions/Outcomes Electronic espionage, Zombie networks, Spyware, Website defacement, 
Computer worms, Trojan horses, Root kits, Ransomware, Leak of 
information, Bot net, Trap doors, Logic bombs 
 
A careful review of the hacks, vulnerabilities, and 
security measures identified in relevant literature 
allowed us to organize seven principles of hacking 
that form the basis for our deep features. In the 
next section we will empirically test and validate 
the categorization of these hacking principles. It is 
worth noting that the last category titled 
“Actions/Outcomes” in Table 3 does not contain 
hacking techniques, but rather contains outcomes 
of hacking activities. This category was not 
considered ideal for evaluating a person’s ability 
to carry out a hacking attempt, but rather how well 
someone knows about hacking activities in 
general, therefore, it was excluded from our final 
set of deep features. For the conceptual expertise 
task, deep features are coupled with their 
corresponding surface features to create a matrix. 
We created three areas of surface features, namely 
financial data, fake websites, and 
usernames/passwords, to correspond with six deep 
features. Table 4 contains the 18 scenarios 
resulting from the use of the features contained in 
the matrix. Recall that Table 1 contains the matrix 
depicting how the deep features are crossed with 
the surface features. 
2.2.3 Assessing Content Validity 
Before using this task to discriminate between 
novice and expert hackers, the items must first be 
scientifically validated. The validation process will 
be completed using two approaches. First, expert 
information security practitioners and academics 
will review our proposed methodology and 
provide feedback. Second, the scenarios presented 
in Table 4 will be empirically validated using an 
item-ranking task. We have already compiled 
feedback on the hacking conceptual expertise task 
proposed in this paper; feedback was solicited 
from four security experts with either an industry 
or academic background. The general consensus 
of the polled experts is that this is a feasible 
approach for discriminating between expert and 
novice hackers. A common concern is that our 
approach may only measure how well a hacker 
conceptually understands hacking methods 
without directly assessing a hacker’s actual ability. 
Table 4 Hacking conceptual expertise scenarios 
Hack # Scenario 
Removing log files A 
Eve deletes log files as she combs through a compromised machine looking 
for tax returns. 
Port scanning B Eve uses a malicious website to scan for open ports of visitors. 
Phishing C 
Eve, pretending to be a bank website, emails Kelly asking for her bank 
information. 
Rainbow tables D Eve uses a rainbow table to decrypt secret military intranet links. 
SQL injection E 
Eve uses a semicolon in a web form to access user account balances in the 
database. 
Using proxies F Eve uses a proxy while creating a website to create a zombie network 
Nigerian scam G 
Eve sends Twitter messages en masse asking people to click on an Internet 
link in return for some secret information. 
Certificate authority H 
Eve becomes her own certificate authority as she creates a fictitious e-
commerce business. 
Man-in-the-middle 
attack 
I 
Eve captures Wi-Fi network traffic from a conference to watch for financial 
transactions. 
Improper file 
validation 
J 
Eve uploads an executable to a server expecting an image, the executable 
sends out instant messages with Internet links to random email addresses. 
Pharming K 
Eve creates a website similar to a well-known company using a similar 
domain name. 
Ping sweep L 
Eve sends a ping to networked machines and then sends an Internet link as 
a message to live machines. 
HTTP POST DOS 
attack 
M 
Eve creates fake websites that post to a targeted website normally, but that 
are extremely slow (e.g. 1 byte/110 seconds). 
Malware signature 
avoidance 
N 
Eve has created a virus to look for Internet links to sensitive data stored on 
a computer that changes itself after every install. 
Password salting O 
Eve is attempting to figure out the salt that was used for some financial 
transactions. 
Email DOS P Eve created a script to send hundreds of emails with an Internet link using 
fake email addresses to a particular company leader. 
Cross-site scripting Q 
Eve posts a response on a forum that allows Eve to redirect users to a 
malicious website. 
Smurf attack R 
Eve sends out requests to millions of machines using the IP address of the 
server of a stock trading institution. 
More specifically, one of the security experts 
stated that deep features “…are more clear cut 
than the surface features.” Another security expert 
suggested that the deep pairings may be too 
intuitive. However, we do not consider these 
responses to be troubling as experts should 
consider deep features to be both clear and 
intuitive. We take these comments as a sign that 
the measurement method is well specified. 
There were a number of other requests from the 
security experts that we will incorporate in the 
next iteration of the measurement tool. For 
example, one security expert suggested that we 
include script kiddie scenarios that reference the 
use of existing prepackaged tools. Another 
security expert suggested that we include more 
hardware exploits. 
Upon incorporating this feedback into a new set of 
items, we will empirically validate the items by 
selecting 20 new security experts from a state 
information security team. To empirically validate 
the items, each item should be adequately 
representative of the deep feature to which it is 
assigned [9], [41], [42]. Mackenzie et al. [9] 
recommended a technique suggested by Hinkin 
and Tracey [43] in which a matrix is created with 
the items in the first column and the deep features 
listed as column headers. The matrix is then 
distributed to raters who are asked to rate how 
well each item fits with each column header on a 
five-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all; 5 = 
completely). Table 5 contains a hypothetical 
example of the matrix that we will use. Data 
collection for both of these approaches is currently 
underway. Preliminary findings from both 
approaches will be reported at the conference. 
 
Table 5 Hypothetical example of item rating task 
Rater # = 001 
Authentication
/Authorization 
Hiding 
tracks 
Input 
validation
/Memory 
override 
Resource 
consumption 
Social 
engineering 
Vulnerability 
detection 
Eve deletes log 
files as she combs 
through a 
compromised 
machine looking for 
tax returns. 
1 5 1 2 1 2 
Eve uses a 
malicious website 
to scan for open 
ports of visitors. 
1 1 1 2 2 4 
… … … … … … … 
Eve sends out 
requests to millions 
of machines using 
the IP address of 
2 1 1 4 1 2 
the server of a 
stock trading 
institution. 
 
2.3 Model Specification 
The next phase in scale development is to specify 
how the indicators capture the expected 
relationships with the construct [9]. While this 
stage typically involves specifying formative or 
reflective indicators for a construct, the conceptual 
expertise task does not treat the indicators as 
formative measures in a scale, rather they are used 
to calculate a single expertise score. Therefore, our 
model specification will be the percentage of deep 
pairs identified by a participant compared to the 
percentage of surface pairs identified by the 
participant. 
 
2.4 Scale Evaluation and Refinement 
Scale evaluation and refinement is a two-step 
process based on (1) conducting a pilot study and 
(2) modifying items in the survey. After revising 
the scenarios from the feedback we receive from 
experts participating in our item-validation tasks, 
we will conduct a pilot study comprised of 20 
security experts, 20 novices, and 20 claimed 
hackers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Security 
experts will be selected from government and 
corporate information security teams with 
connections to the university. Novices will be 
selected from introductory Computer Science, 
Informatics, or Information Systems courses. The 
pilot study will allow us to further refine the scale 
by adjusting the scenarios based on our results. 
We will look to refine scenarios that are paired by 
experts using surface features as well as scenarios 
paired by novices based on deep features. We will 
also look for scenarios commonly paired in 
unexpected ways. The item-refinement process is 
iterative and will be carried out until the scale 
possesses sufficient discriminatory power. 
2.5 Validation 
Validation is a three-step process comprised of the 
following tasks: 1) gathering data from a complete 
sample, 2) assessing scale validity, and 3) cross-
validating the scale [9]. As the scenarios will 
evolve throughout the pilot-testing process, we 
will conduct the main data collection with a full-
sized sample. We will sample 50 security experts, 
50 novices, and 50 self-identified hackers from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Once the full-sized sample is collected we can 
assess the scale’s validity in two ways. First, we 
will be able to use a known-group comparison 
method, and second, we will assess the 
nomological validity of the scale. The known-
group comparison is the use of groups (novices 
and experts) that should demonstrate differences 
on the scale [9]. We expect that novices will create 
more surface pairings than experts, and that 
novices will create less deep pairings than experts.  
To assess nomological validity we will measure 
how well hacking conceptual expertise relates to 
similar measures. Specifically, we expect hacking 
conceptual expertise to increase perceptions of 
computing ability measured through computer 
self-efficacy and computer ability (see Figure 1).  
2.6 Norm Development 
The last step in scale development is to develop 
norms for the scale. This involves discovering the 
distribution of the scores from different 
populations. While we currently do not have plans 
to create norms for this scale, we are optimistic 
that this paper will serve as a foundation for 
developing norms in future work. 
 
Figure 1 Measurement model 
3. CONCLUSION 
Hackers continue to pose a serious threat to 
organizations. Security researchers can benefit 
from a greater understanding of how and why 
hackers engage in criminal behavior. A limiting 
factor of such studies is the inability to verify that 
self-proclaimed hackers participating in research 
actually possess their purported knowledge and 
skills. This paper presents a cogent plan to develop 
and validate a conceptual-expertise based tool that 
can be used to discriminate between novice and 
expert hackers.  
The proposed tool operates on the premise that 
given a set of scenarios, experts will rely on their 
understanding of abstract categories to organize 
problems based on principles of the domain 
whereas novices organize problems based on 
physical evidence, explicit words, or formulas. In 
other words, experts will group items based on 
deeper features while novices will group items 
based on surface features. To create a conceptual-
expertise based tool for measuring hacker ability 
that possesses sufficient discriminatory power, 
items must first be developed and validated. We 
have developed 18 scenarios and are in the process 
of refining both the task and the scenarios by 
soliciting feedback from information security 
experts. These 18 scenarios will be a scale that can 
be used in survey-based research to measure 
hacker skill level. Once feedback from solicited 
experts is analyzed, our model will be refined 
followed iterative pilot testing and data collection. 
The implications of this work are promising as 
behavioral information systems researchers 
operating in the information security space will 
directly benefit from the validation of this tool. 
Furthermore, adaptations of this tool have the 
potential to be utilized in a variety of contexts and 
applications in information systems research.  
REFERENCES 
[1] Verizon, “2012 data breach investigations 
report,” 2012. 
[2] D. Dey, A. Lahiri, and G. Zhang, “Hacker 
behavior, network effects, and the security 
software market,” J. Manag. Inf. Syst., vol. 
29, no. 2, pp. 77–108, Oct. 2012. 
[3] M. A. Mahmood, M. Siponen, D. Straub, H. 
R. Rao, and T. S. Raghu, “Moving toward 
black hat research in Information Systems 
security: An editorial introduction to the 
special issue,” MIS Q., vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 
431–433, 2010. 
[4] Z. Xu, Q. Hu, and C. Zhang, “Why computer 
talents become computer hackers,” Commun. 
ACM, vol. 56, no. 4, p. 64, Apr. 2013. 
[5] J. S. Giboney, A. Durcikova, and R. W. 
Zmud, “What motivates hackers? Insights 
from the Awareness-Motivation-Capability 
Framework and the General Theory of 
Crime,” in Dewald Roode Information 
Security Research Workshop, 2013, pp. 1–40. 
[6] M. K. Rogers, “A two-dimensional 
circumplex approach to the development of a 
hacker taxonomy,” Digit. Investig., vol. 3, no. 
2, pp. 97–102, Jun. 2006. 
[7] R. Chiesa and S. Ducci, Profiling Hackers: 
The Science of Criminal Profiling as Applied 
to the World of Hacking. Boca Raton, FL: 
Auerbach Publications, 2009. 
[8] A. E. Voiskounsky and O. V Smyslova, 
“Flow-based model of computer hackers’ 
motivation.,” CyberPsychology Behav., vol. 
6, no. 2, pp. 171–180, Apr. 2003. 
[9] S. B. Mackenzie, P. M. Podsakoff, and N. P. 
Podsakoff, “Construct measurement and 
validation procedures in MIS and behavioral 
research: Integrating new and existing 
techniques,” MIS Q., vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 293–
334, 2011. 
[10] M. T. H. Chi and P. J. Feltovich, 
“Categorization and representation of physics 
problems by experts and novices,” Cogn. Sci., 
vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 121–152, 1981. 
[11] J. I. Smith, E. D. Combs, P. H. Nagami, V. 
M. Alto, H. G. Goh, M. A. A. Gourdet, C. M. 
Hough, A. E. Nickell, A. G. Peer, J. D. Coley, 
and K. D. Tanner, “Development of the 
Biology Card Sorting Task to Measure 
Conceptual Expertise in Biology,” CBE-Life 
Sci. Educ., vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 628–644, Dec. 
2013. 
[12] M. T. H. Chi, “Laboratory methods for 
assessing experts’ and novices' knowledge,” 
in The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise 
and Expert Performance, K. A. Ericsson, N. 
Charness, P. J. Feltovich, and R. R. Hoffman, 
Eds. Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 
167–184. 
[13] D. R. Compeau and C. A. Higgins, 
“Computer self-efficacy: Development of a 
measure and initial test,” MIS Q., vol. 19, no. 
2, pp. 189–211, 1995. 
[14] P. H. Cheney and R. R. Nelson, “A tool for 
measuring and analyzing end user computing 
abilities,” Inf. Process. Manag., vol. 24, no. 
2, pp. 199–203, 1988. 
[15] T. J. Holt, “Subcultural evolution? Examining 
the influence of on- and off-line experiences 
on deviant subcultures,” Deviant Behav., vol. 
28, no. 2, pp. 171–198, Feb. 2007. 
[16] A. Bandura, “Social cognitive theory: An 
agentic perspective,” Annu. Rev. Psychol., 
vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 1–26, 2001. 
[17] A. Bandura, “Self-efficacy mechanism in 
human agency,” Am. Psychol., vol. 37, no. 2, 
pp. 122–147, 1982. 
[18] A. Newell and H. A. Simon, Human Problem 
Solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1972. 
[19] A. Chandra and R. Krovi, “Representational 
congruence and information retrieval: 
Towards an extended model of cognitive fit,” 
Decis. Support Syst., vol. 25, pp. 271–288, 
1999. 
[20] H. A. Simon and J. R. Hayes, “Understanding 
written problem instructions.,” in Knowledge 
and Cognition, L. W. Gregg, Ed. Potomac, 
MD: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1974, 
pp. 165–200. 
[21] J. R. Hayes and H. A. Simon, “Psychological 
differences among problem isomorphs,” in 
Cognitive Theory, 2nd ed., J. N. Castellan Jr., 
D. B. Pisoni, and G. R. Potts, Eds. Hillsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977, pp. 
21–41. 
[22] M. Weiser and J. Shertz, “Programming 
problem representation in novice and expert 
programmers,” Int. J. Man. Mach. Stud., vol. 
19, no. 4, pp. 391–398, 1983. 
[23] C. P. Pfleeger and S. L. Pfleeger, Security in 
Computing, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ, 
USA: Prentice Hall, 2006. 
[24] M. T. Goodrich and R. Tamassia, 
Introduction to Computer Security. Boston, 
MA: Pearson Education, Inc., 2011. 
[25] T. Jordan, “Mapping Hacktivism: Mass 
Virtual Direct Action (MVDA), Individual 
Virtual Direct Action (IVDA) And Cyber-
wars,” Comput. Fraud Secur., vol. 4, no. 1, 
pp. 8–11, 2001. 
[26] T. Jordan and P. Taylor, “A sociology of 
hackers,” Sociol. Rev., vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 
757–780, Nov. 1998. 
[27] S. M. Furnell and M. J. Warren, “Computer 
hacking and cyber terrorism: The real threats 
in the new millennium?,” Comput. Secur., 
vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 28–34, 1999. 
[28] O. Turgeman-Goldschmidt, “Hackers’ 
Accounts: Hacking as a Social 
Entertainment,” Soc. Sci. Comput. Rev., vol. 
23, no. 1, pp. 8–23, Feb. 2005. 
[29] V. Mookerjee, R. Mookerjee, A. Bensoussan, 
and W. T. Yue, “When hackers talk: 
Managing information security under variable 
attack rates and knowledge dissemination,” 
Inf. Syst. Res., vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 606–623, 
2011. 
[30] D. P. Twitchell, “Augmenting detection of 
social engineering attacks using deception 
detection technology,” in International 
Conference on i-Warfare and Security, 2006. 
[31] R. E. Bell, “The prosecution of computer 
crime,” J. Financ. Crime, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 
308–325, 2002. 
[32] H. Liang and Y. Xue, “Avoidance of 
information technology threats: A theoretical 
perspective,” MIS Q., vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 71–
90, 2009. 
[33] G. B. Magklaras and S. M. Furnell, “Insider 
threat prediction tool: Evaluating the 
probability of IT misuse,” Comput. Secur., 
vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 62–73, 2002. 
[34] Symantec Corporation, “Internet Security 
Threat Report,” Mountain View, California, 
2013. 
[35] L. Holmlund, D. Mucisko, K. Kimberland, 
and J. Freyre, “2010 cybersecurity watch 
survey: Cybercrime increasing faster than 
some company defenses,” 2010. 
[36] CyberEdge Group, “2014 Cyberthreat 
Defense Report,” 2014. 
[37] R. T. Wright and K. Marett, “The influence 
of experiential and dispositional factors in 
phishing: An empirical investigation of the 
deceived,” J. Manag. Inf. Syst., vol. 27, no. 1, 
pp. 273–303, 2010. 
[38] B. Parmar, “Protecting against spear-
phishing,” Comput. Fraud Secur., vol. 2012, 
no. 1, pp. 8–11, Jan. 2012. 
[39] S. Goel and H. A. Shawky, “Estimating the 
market impact of security breach 
announcements on firm values,” Inf. Manag., 
vol. 46, no. 7, pp. 404–410, Oct. 2009. 
[40] R. Boyle and J. G. Proudfoot, Applied 
Information Security: A Hands-On Guide to 
Information Security Software, 2nd ed. New 
Jersey: Pearson, 2014. 
[41] F. N. Kerlinger and H. B. Lee, Foundations 
of Behavioral Research, 4th ed. New York: 
Cengage Learning, 1999. 
[42] D. W. Straub, M.-C. Boudreau, and D. Gefen, 
“Validation guidelines for IS positivist 
research,” Commun. Assoc. Inf. Syst., vol. 13, 
no. 1, pp. 380–427, 2004. 
[43] T. R. Hinkin and J. B. Tracey, “An analysis 
of variance approach to content validation,” 
Organ. Res. Methods, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 175–
186, 1999.  
  
  
  
